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Trying terrorists in Article III courts presents a host of
complications and problems. As terrorism cases come before
civilian courts, prosecutors have had to wrestle with these
challenges. The most significant challenge may be the tension
between protecting national-security secrets and prosecuting those
who threaten national security in open court. The Classified
Information Procedures Act (CIPA) is the main litigation tool for
dealing with these challenges.
Two cases, both with Minnesota roots, demonstrate the
challenges that face civil prosecution in terrorism cases.
Mohammed Abdullah Warsame, a largely unknown name, is being
tried in the District of Minnesota on material support charges.
Michael Ward, a former assistant U.S. Attorney (AUSA) for the
District of Minnesota, initially led Warsame's prosecution.' The
complications caused by CIPA have already prolonged Warsame's
prosecution for four years-with no end currently in sight.
Zacarias Moussaoui is the other example. Moussaoui was
discovered in Minnesota when flight school officials notified the
FBI of his suspicious behavior. Moussaoui was arrested in
Minnesota and subsequently tried in the Eastern District of
Virginia. Robert Spencer, former AUSA for the Eastern District of
Virginia, led Moussaoui's prosecution.2  The Moussaoui
prosecution was fraught with difficulties, but his sentencing has
t J.D. Candidate, William Mitchell College of Law, 2009; Ph.D., University
of Minnesota, 2003; B.A., Hanover College, 1998.
1. See E-mail from Michael Ward, former Assistant U.S. Attorney, Dist. of
Minn. (Dec. 11, 2007) (on file with author). All Ward commentary emanates from
this source.
2. See Telephone Interview with Robert Spencer, former Assistant U.S.
Attorney for the E. Dist. of Va. (Nov. 27, 2007); Robert Spencer, Remarks at
William Mitchell College of Law National Security Forum: One 9/11 Case. Five
Years of Controversy (TPT television broadcast Nov. 28, 2006) (video on file with
the William Mitchell Warren E. Burger Library of Law). All Spencer commentary
emanates from these two sources.
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provided a rare, cathartic moment for the 9/11 survivors. This
essay also includes comments from Eastern District of Michigan
Judge Gerald Rosen. 3 Judge Rosen is one of few judicial members
to have visited CIA headquarters in handling CIPA concerns. In
their visits to the National Security Forum at William Mitchell
College of Law, and elsewhere, Michael Ward, Robert Spencer, and
Judge Gerald Rosen have explicated the complications and benefits
that attend trying terrorists in Article III courts.
I. BACKGROUND: TWO TERRORISTS IN ARTICLE III COURTS
A. The Mini-Moussaoui
Abdullah Warsame is not a household name, even to those
who follow national security law. Warsame is a husband and father
with a sociable and friendly personality. In 2003, he was excelling
as a student at a community college in Minneapolis, Minnesota. A
professor had even suggested him for a scholarship. At first glance,
Warsame seemed a model example of an immigrant making good
of the American dream.
However, on the morning of December 8, 2003, as Warsame
prepared for his fall-semester finals, agents from the Federal
Bureau of Investigation (FBI) knocked on his door. Soon after
Warsame allowed the three agents into his small apartment, Special
Agent Harry Samit began asking about Warsame's background and
travels. The interrogation began "[v] ery lighthearted and very
upbeat. 4 But when Samit pressed Warsame about whether he had
ever traveled to Pakistan, Warsame "sagged in his chair., 5 At this
point, Samit suggested that they move to a more private location.6
Warsame agreed to go with the agents, but they did not tell
Warsame that they were planning to go to a deserted military base
over a hundred miles away. After a long drive and a pit-stop at
KFC, the group arrived at Camp Ripley. The FBI had set up two
houses on the base. One house was wired with cameras and used
3. Honorable Gerald E. Rosen, U.S. Dist. Judge for the E. Dist. of Mich.,
Address at William Mitchell College of Law National Security Forum: Lawfare:
Terrorism and the Courts (Feb. 16, 2006) (video on file with the William Mitchell
Warren E. Burger Library of Law). All Rosen commentary emanates from this
source.
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for interviewing and housing Warsame. FBI agents and an AUSA
watched the interviews on closed-circuit television from the second
house.
The FBI questioned Warsame for two days. Over the course of
the interviews, Warsame admitted that he immigrated to
Afghanistan in 2000 and intended to stay permanently. Warsame
also admitted that while in Afghanistan, he had attended two al
Qaeda training camps.
On the second day, Warsame demanded he be returned to the
Twin Cities. Upon returning to the Cities, Warsame refused to
cooperate further, and the agents arrested him. After being held
briefly as a material witness in the Southern District of New York,
Warsame was charged in the District of Minnesota with conspiracy
to provide material support to a designated foreign terrorist
organization (FTO), providing material support to a FTO, and
making false statements to the FBI.
Warsame has been in custody for over five years and his trial is
nowhere in sight. An appeal concerning his motion to suppress
statements is now pending before the Eighth Circuit. Warsame has
generated little commentary, but it is a text-book example of the
problems that attend trying terrorists in Article III courts.
B. Zacarias Moussaoui
Zacarias Moussaoui was arrested in August 2001 and finally
sentenced in May 2006. Moussaoui had entered the United States
on February 23, 2001, on a visa waiver. After attending a flight
school in Oklahoma, Moussaoui moved to Eagan, Minnesota to
attend Pan Am International Flight Academy. A flight school
employee became suspicious of Moussaoui and called the local FBI.
Samit and his team immediately recognized the red flags. A
vigorous debate ensued between local FBI and headquarters as to
whether they could obtain a warrant to search Moussaoui's
possessions. In the end, headquarters won-the investigators did
not get a search warrant.
Many have debated whether issuance of that warrant could
have prevented the 9/11 attacks. Robert Spencer argues that a
search warrant would not have unraveled the 9/11 plot. The 9/11
Commission arrived at the same conclusion. However, Michael
Ward contends that the question is not so clear, suggesting that a
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It was not until immediately after 9/11, however, that the
government unraveled the conspiracy. Even as fires still burned at
ground zero in New York, the Justice Department decided to try
Moussaoui in the Eastern District of Virginia for his role in the
9/11 attacks. Spencer was lead prosecutor. His experience with
CIPA made him an ideal choice. He is, arguably, the only U.S.
Attorney to have taken both terrorism and espionage cases to trial.
The Eastern District of Virginia was equally well equipped to
handle the trial. But in spite of the talent of those involved in
Moussaoui's trial, commentators have called it a "circus"7 and "a sad
relic of the past, a modem version of Bleak House. The case
slogged on for four-and-a-half years, even though Moussaoui
eventually pled guilty. Like Warsame, the Moussaoui case calls into
question the ability of our Article III courts to handle terrorism
prosecutions.
II. CLASSIFIED INFORMATION IN PUBLIC COURTS
For both Warsame and Moussaoui, classified information
severely hampered the quick expedition of the cases. If a
prosecution implicates classified information, the prosecutor has
three options. First, the prosecutor can seek to have the
information declassified. Second, if the information is too sensitive
to declassify, the prosecutor can try to prevent classified
information from being relevant at trial. The third option is
dismissing the charges.
Classified information creates a tension between competing
policies. The government desires to keep classified information
secret, to protect sources, to protect intelligence techniques and
capabilities, and, on a grander scale, to protect national security
imperatives. But defendants' rights to effective counsel, to
confront the government's evidence, and to aid in mounting a
defense counterbalance the government's interest in secrecy.
A. CIPA Mechanics
CIPA governs the use of classified information in criminal
7. Stephen A. Saltzburg, A Different War: Ten Key Questions on the War on
Terror, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 1021, 1037 (2007).
8. A. John Radsan, The Moussaoui Case: The Mess from Minnesota, 31 WM.
MITCHELL L. REv. 1417,1420 (2005).
[Vol.34:55126
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proceedings." Under a two-step process, a presiding judge must
first determine whether the information must be produced by the
government (discovery and disclosure) and then determine
whether the information is admissible at trial.' ° Thus, the first step
governs defendants' access to evidence. CIPA allows the
government to present classified information to the court ex parte
and in camera, so that the court can decide whether the
information is discoverable under the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure or must be disclosed under Brady v. Maryland." Here,
the evidence may retain its classified status since the defense
counsel will have a security clearance. The second step determines
whether the evidence may be disclosed at trial, which would
necessarily destroy the classified status of the evidence.
B. A Three-Body Problem2
For prosecutors, CIPA is a three-body problem involving the
interplay between intelligence agencies, defendant, and judge.
1. The Prosecutor and the Intelligence Agencies
Dealing with intelligence agencies is a particularly difficult
aspect of CIPA that has received relatively little attention.
Obviously, when prosecuting a terrorist, the prosecutor may have to
draw on evidence collected from intelligence sources. What is not
so obvious, at least at first glance, is the tension that inheres
between the intelligence agency and the prosecutor. The
intelligence agency may not want to disclose sensitive classified
information to the cleared defense counsel, to the judge, or even to
the prosecutor.
Ward describes the situation as "being fraught with peril."
First, the prosecutor must tailor charges so that the classified
information will be protected. Ward describes the process in the
following manner: "After carefully considering [the] intelligence
and its implications for their case, a prosecutor needs to draft the
criminal charges very carefully and . . . narrowly . . . to avoid
9. See 18 U.S.C. app. 3 §§ 1-16 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
10. Seeid.§§4,6.
11. 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
12. The three-body problem is the famous physics problem of solving for the
movement of three celestial bodies under their mutual gravitational attraction. It
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allowing the more sensitive information from becoming relevant to
either the charges or a potential defense."
The Warsame case is a good example of this charge tailoring.
As with most terrorism prosecutions, the charges against Warsame
include violations of the material support statutes. Specifically, the
government alleges that Warsame provided himself as personnel
and gave money to al Qaeda.5 But the allegations against Warsame
suggest that the government could have charged him with more
specific and serious crimes. For example, the allegations that al
Qaeda financed Warsame's return to Canada after training at a
camp with Osama bin Laden, 14 and that Warsame knew Richard
Reid and Zacarias Moussaoui15 suggest crimes much more serious
than material support. According to Ward, the charging process
results in
more narrow and possibly less serious charges being
prosecuted rather than the sweeping and wide ranging
charges that the media and . . . public might expect.
Often, it is this need to keep the charges focused on
subjects that will not impinge on sensitive intelligence that
limits charges rather than the lack of evidence. The
media and public do not understand this reality.
Accordingly, the charges against Warsame may suggest that he
is a small fish, but the reality may be something different.
The irony is that by fashioning narrow charges, the
government defeats the major advantage of Article III courts:
publicity. When the public looks at these material support charges
it is often under whelmed. By proceeding with watered-down
charges the government fails to show the true nature of the enemy
it has neutralized.
One thing that is not lost by charging material support crimes,
13. Bill of Particulars at 1-2, United States v. Warsame, Criminal No. 04-29
(D. Minn. Mar. 16, 2007).
14. See Brief for the United States at 3, United States v. Warsame, No. 07-2560
(8th Cir. Sept. 11, 2007) (alleging Warsame attended two terrorist training camps
and met and dined with bin Laden); Defendant's Reply to Government's
Response to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for Lack of a Speedy Trial at 2, United
States v. Warsame, Criminal No. 04-29 (D. Minn. Dec. 27, 2006) (addressing
government allegations that Warsame attended two training camps in Afghanistan
and, after returning to Canada, wired $2000, which was the cost of his return trip
to Canada, back to Pakistan).
15. See Brief of Appellee at 12, United States v. Warsame, No. 07-2560 (8th
Cir. Nov. 2, 2007) (stating that the government questioned Warsame about
contacts with Moussaui and Reid).
[Vol.34:55128
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however, is a hefty sentence. The sentences that attend material
support crimes are staggering, and the Justice Department has a
record of obtaining lengthy sentences." In fact, Warsame's own
defense counsel appeared not to appreciate the magnitude of the
potential sentence. Over a year ago, Warsame, having already
spent four years in custody, argued that he had "already served any
sentence which could reasonably be imposed for such
convictions."" But Warsame's material support charges could
result in thirty years to life under the applicable sentencing• . 18
guidelines.
The Moussaoui case is also an excellent example of the
interplay between intelligence agency and prosecutor. Spencer
explains that the collaboration works but "the general rule is that
there is always a tension." He describes it as a two-front war,
battling both defendant and intelligence agency. According to
Spencer, a major job of the terrorism and espionage prosecutor is
to convince the intelligence agency to allow the evidence to be
used as the basis for a charge. Ward also stresses the importance of
gaining the intelligence agency's trust. Prosecutors must convince
the agency that they value the agency's interests and are committed
to protecting those interests.
Gaining and keeping the trust of an intelligence agency is not
always possible, and Spencer admits that the system sometimes
breaks down. A particularly vivid example involves the recent
controversy over destroyed Central Intelligence Agency (CIA)
tapes. While the recent tape controversy garnered significant
interest, previous controversies involving CIA-interrogation tapes
have received much less media attention. In October 2007, a U.S.
Attorney filed a letter with both the district and the Fourth Circuit
courts describing errors in factual assertions made during the
Moussaoui case. Massaoui had sought access to recorded
interrogations of certain detainees. While litigating the CIPA
issues, the government had stated that the CIA did not have the
16. For example, Hamid Hayat received twenty-four years for attending an al
Qaeda training camp in Pakistan. CarolJ. Williams, Padilla Gets Unexpected Sentence,
L.A. TIMES, Jan. 23 2008, at A12. Jose Padilla received seventeen years for
providing material support; prosecutors complained that the sentence was far too
lenient. Id.
17. Defendant's Reply, supra note 14, at 2.
18. Surreply of the United States to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss for a Lack
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requested recordings. In fact, the CIA had tapes, perhaps courtesy
of a foreign intelligence service, but told the prosecutors otherwise.
The CIA eventually gave the tapes to the prosecutors, who were
then required to crawl back to the courts and correct the error.
The incident is an example of a failure of cooperation between
prosecutors and intelligence agencies. The CIA, and especially the
clandestine service, fiercely protects the agency's interests; interests
put at risk when information is provided to prosecutors who may be
required to give the information to a court or defendant.
According to one former CIA official, CIA operatives "believe that
no one else will look out for them so they have to look out for
themselves."' 9 It is not surprising that dealing with an agency that
"is almost tribal in nature" causes the prosecution headaches.
2. The Prosecutor and the Defendant
The second body that factors into the prosecution's CIPA
equation is the defendant and his or her power of graymail.
Graymail is a defense tactic whereby the defendant seeks to get
classified information admitted at trial in order to induce the
government to drop charges. CIPA does not solve the graymail
problem because it does not necessarily preserve the classified
nature of evidence at trial. Instead, CIPA simply moves the
graymail problem to pretrial. Thus, when the government
prosecutes terrorists it may be forced to choose between the pain of
disclosure and the pain of dismissal.
Graymail typically occurs when, after the security-cleared
defense counsel has examined the evidence, the defendant argues
that the classified information should be admitted at trial.
Moussaoui, however, presented a unique threat because Moussaoui
proceeded pro se. Giving classified information to Moussaoui was
clearly unacceptable. The court eventually revoked Moussaoui's
right to self-representation, relieving some of the pressure on
prosecutors.
Moussaoui's attorneys signed an agreement promising not to
disclose the classified evidence to Moussaoui. Some have argued
that such a requirement is unfair to the defendant. But even
Edward MacMahon, one of Moussaoui's attorneys, agrees that
19. Greg Miller, CIA's Clandestine Service Called Its Own Shots on Tapes, L.A.
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classified evidence should not be given to a member of al Qaeda.
Nevertheless, denying the defendant access to evidence
contravenes the general CIPA position that the "defendant should
not stand in a worse position because of the fact that classified
information is involved. Perhaps this sentiment is viewed best as
more aspirational than actual. The inevitable result is that the
defendant will be worse off when the government's evidence
involves classified information.
In Moussaoui, the government was not even willing to give
cleared defense counsel access to certain information. The
government, rather, produced the information to the district court
ex parte and in camera. The court subsequently ordered the
government to give the information to the defense. It also ordered
the government give the defense access to three witnesses-all
enemy combatants held abroad. The government refused, and the
court struck the death penalty and all references to 9/11 in the
charges. At this point, many commentators believed the
government would drop criminal charges and sweep Moussaoui
into the military system.
The district court's ruling was appealed to the Fourth Circuit.
In large part, the appellate court ruled against the government,
holding that the witnesses were essential to Moussaoui's defense
and finding that the government's summaries of classified evidence
were inadequate. 2' The Fourth Circuit, however, neutralized
Moussaoui's number one graymail card: the government could
24fashion substitutes for access to the detained witnesses. At this
stage, Moussaoui himself may have realized that the Fourth Circuit
had taken his biggest bargaining chip away. When asked why
Moussaoui plead guilty, Spencer replied that Moussaoui might have
realized that he had used up his other options, citing the Fourth
Circuit detainee-access compromise.
This CIPA wrangling was what caused, in large part, the
Moussaoui litigation to drag on. Spencer alluded to this: "We didn't
know . . . when we indicted the case that [Khalid Skeikh
Mohammed (KSM)], Binalshibh, and Mustafa Ahmed al Hawsawi
21. S. Rep. No. 96-823, at *9 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4302.
22. When asked about this unfairness, MacMahon poignantly stated, "anytime
you charge someone with a capital crime there are a lot of things that are unfair."
One 9/11 Case, supra note 2.
23. United States v. Moussaoui, 382 F.3d 453, 456-57, 476 (4th Cir. 2004).
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would be captured alive and held offshore.., and that's what hung
the case up for so long."
If the prosecution could have expected the conservative
Fourth Circuit as its ally in the graymail battle, it could not have
expected its second major ally: The 9/11 Commission. According
to Spencer, the Commission's investigation was initially an
annoyance, because it distracted the agents involved in the
prosecution. But Spencer acknowledges that the Commission's
report led to declassifications that "permitted [the prosecution] to
go forward in [an] Article III court." Without the 9/11
Commission forging the declassification trial, Moussaoui might
have ended up in front of a military commission.
For Warsame, CIPA has largely meant one thing: jail time with
no trial in sight. Nearly three years after Warsame's arrest, he
moved to dismiss the case for a violation of his constitutional right
to a speedy trial. The district court disagreed, citing CIPA
complications.2 ' The court stated that the delays were "largely
inevitable given the unusual and complex nature of cases that
implicate national security interests., 6 It reasoned that the delays
were caused by "the efforts to provide discovery materials vital to
the defense."27
Thus, CIPA's strictures were cited as the reason Warsame has
been in custody for over five years without trial. Warsame took
issue with this logic, pointing out that after three years the
government had not produced a single piece of evidence through
CIPA discovery. The government's "CIPA made me do it"
argument is troublesome because CIPA is a statute that protects
government interests. If the government cannot marshal its
evidence after four years then, arguably, the government should
not be allowed to proceed in an Article III court.
But Warsame's CIPA fight may have just begun. At the time of
this writing, Warsame is on an interlocutory appeal to the Eighth
Circuit concerning the admissibility of Warsame's initial interview
statements. After this issue is resolved, the case may just end up
back in the Eighth Circuit to consider the same CIPA issue
presented in Moussaoui: the defendant's access to high-value
detainees.
Warsame may just seek access to high-value detainees, e.g.,
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KSM. According to the government, both Warsame and KSM were• 28
in Afghanistan in 2000. If the government's allegation that
Warsame was rubbing elbows with bin Laden is correct, then
Warsame could also have been rubbing elbows with KSM. During
the various interrogations of KSM, an operative may have shown
KSM a picture of Warsame and asked if KSM had ever seen
Warsame before. And if KSM said "no" then the evidence might be
exculpatory. By now, Warsame's attorneys have likely received
summaries of detainee statements (should they exist), and they
may just push for access to the detainees. If this CIPA issue plays
out, and one side seeks an interlocutory appeal, it could mean even
more delay. Indeed, this would present the exact same situation
that dragged out Moussaoui. The only difference is that Warsame
has a four-year head start.
Trust also plays an important role in how the defendant and
prosecutor navigate CIPA. In praising the abilities of the AUSAs
prosecuting terrorists and his former colleagues at the Justice
Department's Counterterrorism section, Ward emphasizes the
importance of establishing the defense counsel's trust in handling
CIPA issues:
Prosecutor[s] need[] to ensure ... the trust of the Court
and defense counsel and preserve their confidence that
[the] prosecutors will faithfully uphold their ethical
responsibilities and all the while act as . . . aggressive
advocate [s]. Threading this needle is an extremely
challenging task.
Unfortunately, judging by the tone of Warsame's briefs, the
government's efforts to establish trust have not satisfied defense
counsel. 9
3. CIPA and the Court
The third body in the prosecutor's CIPA equation is the judge.
One of the court's most important roles in CIPA issues is
determining how to use substitute information and redactions. As
28. See NAT'L COMM'N ON TERRORIST ATTAcKs UPON THE U.S., THE 9/11
COMMISSION REPORT 149-50 (2004).
29. Indeed, some of Warsame's briefs strike an indignant (and self-defeating)
tone: "To our shame, the sole reason that [Warsame] has been treated to these
punitive conditions is that he is charg with a 'terrorist offense', [sic] of which he
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discussed above, substitutions for access to the detainees proved
critical in Moussaoui. In Warsame, the district court judge stressed
that substitutions and redactions are a critical step in making CIPA
work. Since the judge is also responsible for reviewing evidence at
the discovery stage, the judge is a major player in determining how
quickly the process proceeds.
According to Judge Rosen, it is critical for the judge to quickly
determine if the government's case will implicate classified
information. If the government even so much as "intimates" that
classified information will be involved, then the court should
immediately schedule a conference to establish protocols for
handling classified information. Judge Rosen warns of the
"problems that can drive the courts and lawyers to distraction,"
namely, those associated with a government assertion of a privilege
based on national security concerns. Judge Rosen, the first judge
to travel to CIA headquarters to examine classified material,
stresses that some information is so sensitive that it could never be
sufficiently "scrubbed" to allow for disclosure at trial. The fact that
the U.S. Government even has possession of certain information is,
according to Judge Rosen, so sensitive that it could risk
destabilizing cooperating foreign governments. Counterbalancing
the government's interest is what Judge Rosen calls the
"granddaddy" of all CIPA problems: ensuring the defendant's
constitutional right to confrontation. Judge Rosen argues that
resolving this conflict is only possible ifjudges think "outside of the
envelope, but inside the Constitution."
III. CIRCUS VERSUS TRIBUNAL
Shortly after Moussaoui was sentenced, then Attorney General
Alberto Gonzales mused on the Moussaoui trial's problems. 30 He
cited its high cost and long duration, and mentioned military
commissions as an alternative. However, as Spencer points out, the
military option has yet to be tested. In spite of the Moussaoui
circus, Article III courts have disposed of other terrorist cases, such
as the embassy-bombings case, with relative expediency.3'
Advocates of criminal justice for terrorists can, perhaps, explain
30. One 9/11 Case, supra note 2.
31. The government convicted four individuals for the bombings of
embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998. Phil Hirschkorn, Four Guilty in Embassy
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away the Moussaoui and Warsame messes by pointing to the novel
legal issues and unique evidentiary circumstances. For example,
Warsame has raised literally every national security issue, many of
which lack Eighth Circuit or Supreme Court precedent:
In many ways, the public nature of Article III courts is an
advantage over a secret military court. Publicity provides at least
two important benefits. First, a public trial exposes the nature of
the enemy to Americans and the world. While Moussaoui is a
spectacular example of how a trial can become a circus, it is an
equally spectacular example of the benefits of a public court. The
final phase of the Moussaoui trial determined the presence of
mitigating and aggravating factors, and the prosecution's case was
mostly witness impact testimony. One juror likened the testimony
to attending one funeral after another. Each gut-wrenching
testimonial delighted Moussaoui. As Spencer put it, the trial
showed the world "what the mind of a terrorist is like." Second,
public trials put the American justice system out in the open. It is,
ideally, a testament to the integrity of our system. But even on a
bad day, exposing the messiness of the judicial process will provide
a check on the system.
The interests of the defendant are conspicuously absent from
this list of public trial benefits. Defendants have, of course, an
interest in fair due process, but no reasonable person advocates
using a military system that is not fair. And the partial secrecy of a
military commission does not necessarily imply an unfair system.
On balance, a public trial is not necessarily in the best interests of
the defendant. In some sense, our civilian criminal justice system
has sacrificed Warsame's right to a speedy trial at the CIPA alter. Is
remaining in custody for years before trial really in Wasarme's best
interest, or would it be better to use an alternative forum that could
process him quickly and fairly? When the legal system hammers the
square terrorist peg into the round Article III court hole, it is done,
32. Warsame has challenged the constitutionality of the material support
statute, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and the President's terrorist
surveillance program. He has also tried to compel the government to identify its
confidential sources. Aside from these national security issues, Warsame has filed
numerous other motions, including a Motion for a Bill of Particulars, a Motion to
Quash Arrest and Suppress Evidence, a Motion for Discovery, and a Motion for
Release from Custody Pending Trial. Nevertheless, recall that the district court's
justification for the delay is CIPA, not an inability to efficiently dispose of
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in large part, for our benefit, not the defendant's."
Those who advocate trying terrorists in Article III courts based
on defendants' interests are, thus, a little like Miss Flite from
Dickens' Bleak House. Miss Flite, the not-quite lucid Chancery
groupie and party to the interminable Jarndyce and Jarndyce
lawsuit, explains why she keeps captive birds: "I began keeping the
little creatures ... [w] ith the intention of restoring them to liberty.
When my judgment should be given . . . . They die in prison,
though. Their lives, poor silly things, are so short in comparison
with Chancery proceedings.,
4
The district court did finally dispose of Moussaoui, and given
the importance of the case, a public trial might well have merited






33. I have skirted several issues here-e.g., a defendant may receive more
process from an Article III court than from a military commission.
34. CHARLES DICKENS, BLEAK HOUSE 56 (Modem Library Paperback ed. 2002)
(1853).
35. Id. at 34 (quote by Miss Flite).
[Vol.34:55136
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